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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THEON MERRILL, ] 
P l a i n t i f f , A p p e l l a n t , ] 
and C r o s s - R e s p o n d e n t , ] 
v s . ] 
CACHE VALLEY DAIRY 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
C o o p e r a t i v e , -
D e f e n d a n t , R e s p o n d e n t , 
and C r o s s - A p p e l l a n t , 
\ PETITION FOR REHEARING 
> Case No. 19204 
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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
Respondent Cache Valley Dairy Association (Cache Valley) hereby 
petitions the Court for rehearing upon the grounds that the 
majority opinion appears to have overlooked or misapprehended 
certain noncontested and indisputable facts and arrived at two 
erroneous conclusions: (1) the majority opinion erroneously 
states that Plaintiff sued Defendant for "damages" allegedly 
sustained as a result of Lir termination and remands the case for 
"proceedings consistent with this opinion," apparently including 
an assessment of damages; and (2) the majority opinion totally 
misapprehends the nature of the May 2 6th resolution and asserts 
that under that resolution Idaho producers could be assessed a 
two percent levy while Utah producers paid only a one percent -
assessment. — 
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-% if Moreover, the majority's analysis of Cache Valley's right to 
.terminate the Plaintiff's association with Cache Valley fails to 
.distinguish between the Plaintiff's status as a "member" and a 
"milk producer" and thus misapprehends a fundamental and well-
established distinction in cooperative law. Since no similar 
cases have been found this case appears to be a case of first 
impression in the area of state cooperative law. Cache Valley 
would respectfully urge the Court to grant rehearing so that the 
opinion receives the benefit of a full adjudication particularly 
in view of the fact the Court appears to have misapprehended 
certain facts which are not disputed by the Appellant and 
Respondent. 
:
 : ,e ' POINT ONE \...;-,;.;;. 
THE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT ONLY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND THUS 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFF SOUGHT 
DAMAGES AND IN REMANDING THE CASE ON THAT BASIS. 
The first paragraph of the majority opinion asserts that the 
Plaintiff sued Cache Valley for "damages allegedly sustained as a 
result of his termination [as a member of the Cache Valley Dairy 
Association]." Plaintiff did not seek damages in either his 
original or amended complaints; rather the Plaintiff sought only 
injunctive relief and reinstatement of the Plaintiff in the Cache 
Valley Dairy Association.1
 t 
1
 In the prayer for relief of both the original complaint dated July 30, 
1982, (pages 5 and 6), and the amended verified complaint dated November 3, 1982, 
the Plaintiff has requested only declaratory relief, no ad damnum or other reference 
to damages exits. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The majority opinion remands the matter to the district 
court for "proceedings consistent" with the opinion. If the 
erroneous assumption that the Plaintiff sought damages is 
accepted, such "proceedings" would arguably include an assessment 
and award of damages that the Plaintiff neither sought nor 
proved. Thus, the majority's misapprehension of the type of 
relief sought by the Plaintiff has led to a factually flawed 
decision and has increased the risk faced by Cache Valley. 
Indeed, as explained further in the "Suggestion of Mootness," 
filed separately on this date, the issue of the Plaintiff's 
entitlement to the injunctive relief sought is now moot because 
the Plaintiff has left the Dairy business altogether to teach 
school in Arizona. 
POINT TWO 
THE MAJORITYfS ASSERTION THAT THE MAY 26TH RESOLUTION 
EFFECTIVELY LEVIES A TWO PERCENT ASSESSMENT ON IDAHO 
MEMBERS AND A ONE PERCENT ASSESSMENT ON UTAH MEMBERS IS 
ERRONEOUS AND IF LEFT UNCORRECTED COULD RESULT IN 
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO CACHE VALLEY. 
The May 26th resolution provides: 
(1) Paying the assessment imposed on the sale of 
milk as provided by Section 4-22-7 U.C.A. 1953 as 
amended, wherein such funds are used by the Utah Dairy 
Commission to promote the sale and advertising of dairy 
products; or 
3 
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.«*-, * (2) Any members who elect to have the 1% refunded ~ 
to them pursuant to the foregoing statute as authorized 
by state law, then such member shall be required to 
deposit said refund or the equivalent thereof and pay 
thejsame to the Cache Valley Dairy Association for the 
Association to use in its sales promotions and 
advertising of its dairy products which are marketed by 
the Association. 
Any member of this Association who refuses to 
pay the assessment for advertising and sales promotion 
as set forth above, shall be deemed to be a non-
cooperator and their membership may be terminated at 
the election of the Board of Directors. 
The majority opinion asserts that the Plaintiff claimed the 
assessment was not uniform and concurs with the Plaintiff, 
stating "the resolution effectively levies a two percent 
assessment on Idaho members and a one percent assessment on Utah 
members." Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, slip. op. 
no. 19204 at 6 (December 1, 1987) . In reaching those 
conclusions, the majority has ignored the fact that the issue of 
inequality was never raised by the Plaintiff on appeal and has 
misapprehended the function of the May 2 6th resolution. 
^ The |May 26th resolution was designed to create a parity 
between Utah and Idaho members. Utah law provides a one percent 
assessment on the sale of milk to provide revenue for use in 
financing Utah Dairy Commission promotions. See Utah Code Ann. 
§4-22-7. Idaho law also imposes a one percent assessment for use 
by the Idaho Dairy Commission in sponsoring promotion. See Idaho 
Code §25-3117. Unlike Idaho law, however, Utah statutes allow 
milk producers to opt out of the levy and claim a refund. See 
Utah Code Ann. 214-22-7(4). 
4 
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Thus, if state law alone determined the issue, Idaho members 
would pay a mandatory one percent assessment while Utah members 
could choose not to pay the assessment imposed by Utah law (by 
requesting a refund) . The undisputed intent of the May 26th 
resolution was to equalize the position of Utah and Idaho members 
by requiring Utah members to return to Cache Valley any refunds 
they received from the state for use in Cache Valley's 
promotional efforts. i 
At no point has it ever been maintained either by the 
Appellant or by the Respondent that the Idaho producers were not 
receiving credit for their state mandated assessment. This is 
the primary reason why this case has reached the Court since the 
May 2 6th resolution was adopted to maintain equality in the 
organization between the Idaho producers and the Utah producers. 
The factual conclusion that the May 26th resolution results in a 
two (2%) percent assessment to the Idaho producers should not 
have been addressed on appeal as this was never raised by the 
Appellant in the either the trial court below, or in his briefs 
to the Supreme Court, is not essential to a resolution of the 
case and in fact ignores what in reality has been the practice of 
the Association. 
i 
j 
i 
• : . : • ' . : i : • • : . . . «••••• 
t 
1 
5 i 
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1 
-This erroneous conclusion can only give the Idaho producers 
the impression that all the Utah producers, (not merely the 
handful who requested a refund) are not paying their fair share 
thus creating further disharmony and discord among the interstate 
membership cf the Cooperative. 
It is respectively urged that the majority withdraw any and 
all reference to a two percent assessment to the Idaho producers 
as the effect of this on long term relationships with the Idaho 
members is extremely damaging, is not in practice correct (and 
was never questioned until now) and is not necessary to reach the 
ultimate results which the majority opinion decides. 
If the Court desires to reverse the trial court, the 
majority opinion under Part III of its opinion provides adequate 
basis for holding for Plaintiff. By doing this, it will not 
unnecessarily do violence to the Cooperative's Board of 
Directors1 efforts in attempting to maintain equality between the 
Idaho and the Utah producer members of the Association. 
Cache Valley respectfully requests that the Court rehear 
this matter or alternatively reissue the majority opinion with 
the two errors corrected. 
6 
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POINT THREE 
THE MAJORITY OPINIONfS REASONING FAILS TO ADEQUATELY 
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PLAINTIFF'S STATUS AS A "MEMBER" OF 
CACHE VALLEY ASSOCIATION AND AS A "MILK PRODUCER" AND 
THUS MISAPPREHENDS A FUNDAMENTAL AND WELL-ESTABLISHED 
DISTINCTION IN COOPERATIVE LAW. 
Because the Respondent, Cache Valley Dairy Association, 
operates as a cooperative under Title 3, Utah Code Annotated, the 
Plaintiff, Theon Merrill, occupies two separate and distinct 
legal relationships with the Association. It is respectfully 
submitted that the majority errs in its legal analysis by failing 
to treat the termination of the "independent contractor-milk 
producer" contract relationship separately from that of the 
termination under the bylaws of the "membership" relationship. 
Although this analogy may not be perfect, it appears that 
the majority opinion ignores the termination of the Plaintiff 
under the contractual relationship and keys solely on the May 
2 6th resolution. Because the majority opinion merges in its 
analysis the rights and obligations under these separate 
relationships, it would appear that there is an unstated premise 
which has not been fully tested for its correctness. For 
example, if one were to argue that Notre Dame is a Catholic 
Institution and conclude therefrom that all those who attend 
Notre Dame are Catholics one would be falsely assuming that the 
only students registered at Notre Dame are Catholic! students, a ~my 
7 
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i 
premise which is false. Similarly to conclude that the 
Association cannot have rights of termination regarding the "milk 
contract" with its "milk suppliers" which are broader than the 
Association's rights to terminate the "membership" relationship 
is to assume without stating clearly that the rights and 
obligations of the parties and the two positions they occupy to 
one another are not separate or distinct, but are the same. It 
is respectfully submitted that this is a serious fallacy. Since 
there are very few opinions regarding this subject matter upon 
which one can obtain guidance, it would seem imperative for this 
Court to issue a well reasoned opinion, since this is likely to 
become a controlling case on future cooperative law. 
Title 3 UCA clearly delineates and maintains a distinction 
between the "member" relationship and the "milk supplier or 
producer" relationship which a milk producer occupies. Title 3 
grants Cache Valley the status of a separate legal entity' 
(separate from its members) and sets out specific statutory 
prov sions required for the bylaws of the organization which 
control the "membership" relationship and separate statutory 
provisions which control the "milk supplier" or "producer" 
relationship. V 
As a "member" of the Association, the Plaintiff Merrill and 
Cache Valley Dairy have certain rights and obligations vis a vis-
one another. The Plaintiff is entitled to one vote; as a member' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of the Cooperative. As a "member" he was also entitled to share 
in the profits of the Association based on his patronage of the 
Association. In addition, as a "member" he was given certain 
protection underneath the bylaws as well as Title 3 itself, which 
protections are specifically established and operate in his favor 
in his capacity as a "member" of the Association. 
As a "producer" or an "independent contractor-supplier of 
milk" to the cooperative, the Plaintiff Merrill and Cache Valley 
Dairy have other (additional) rights and obligations vis a vis 
one another. In his capacity as a "milk producer," Plaintiff 
Merrill was required to ship milk meeting minimum state health 
quality standards (i.e. bacteria free) capable of being utilized 
in the Association's production facilities to produce quality 
dairy products. As a "milk producer," the Plaintiff Merrill was 
contractually required to meet certain health laws and 
regulations set up regarding the cleanliness of his dairy herd 
and facilities as well as other contractual obligations. As a 
milk producer, the Plaintiff Merrill received a price for his 
milk which was set on a market rate. This price was set 
independently of any amount of retainage which the Plaintiff 
Merrill would receive as a "member," i.e. from future contingent 
profits of the Association. As a "milk producer," the Plaintiff-v"-^ --
Merrill occupied the legal relationship of an independent 
contractor-supplier of milk to Cache Valley Dairy. If during £'-••• 
9 
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the course of some farming operation Plaintiff Merrill committed 
a tortious harm to a third party, the third party would have no 
right to proceed against the assets of Cache Valley Dairy 
Association, since the Association is not a partnership, but is a 
separate legal entity. If during the course of Cache Valley 
Dairy's operation it were to injure a third party, the converse 
is also true, that the third party could not proceed against the 
Plaintiff Merrill as either a member of the Association or as a ~ 
supplier of milk. The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that 
if this independent contractor-supplier cf milk aspect of the 
legal relationship is ignored or merged in the analysis of the 
rights and obligations of the Association to Merrill and Merrill 
to the Association under the "membership11 relationship that the 
legal analysis is needlessly contaminated. 
It would appear that the majority opinion contains within it 
an unstated premise, i.e. that the legal relationship of the 
Plaintiff Merrill as a "member11 as well as a "producer or 
independent supplier of milk" are merged and are not legally 
different nor do they need to be treated separately and thus, it 
is respectfully submitted, becomes flawed. The Association would 
respectfully submit that its rights to terminate a producer's 
contract under the contract terms are broader than the majority ^ ^ 
recognizes applying their merged analysis. The mindrity opinion rt-c 
l 
10 ! j 
i '•"..'-" 
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appears to have grasped this distinction which the majority 
opinion ignores. It is respectfully submitted that since the 
opinion will become one of the leading cases in the area of state 
cooperative law that the analysis and logic which the Court 
applies to arrive at its conclusions should be clearly stated. 
CONCLUSION 
If the opinion remains in its present form, it could lead to 
a mass exodus of members from the Association (which they have a 
right to withdraw from between June 1 and June 10 each year as 
permitted under their membership contract) which will cause 
greater damage to the Cache Valley Dairy. This could cause 
irreparable harm to the Association if the Idaho producers 
elected to withdraw. * ? . j 
The undersigned respectfully requests the Court to 
reconsider its decision in this matter and if the conclusion 
remains the same, then in the alternative, that the portion 
relating to the resolution and the effects of disparity be 
eliminated from the decision as there are sufficient grounds that 
the Court could sustain its decision and not cause additional 
harm to the dairy that the opinion in its present form is 
expected to cause. • ,; - =-••.:«*.•.::.. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of January, 1988. 
j ... HARRIS, PRESTON, CHAMBERS, & WILLMORE 
i 
.. A . . , ,. " *3> 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Cache ) 
B.H. Harris and Joseph M. Chambers, counsel for the Cache 
Valley Dairy Association, hereby certify that they have read the 
above and foregoing Petition for Rehearing and certify that the 
said petition is presented in good faith and not for delay and 
that the same is made for the purpose of correcting erroneous 
conclusions which were overlooked or misapprehended by the 
majority opinion of the Court which misconstrued certain facts in 
the case as set forth above. That it is imperative the opinion 
if published, be correct factually so conclusions will be based 
upon correct facts. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 5th day of 
January, 1988, ten copies of the foregoing brief were filed with 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court and that on said date, the 
undersigned mailed four copies of the foregoing to William L. 
Schultz, attorney for the Plaintiff and Appellant, 1061 East 2100 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
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